Thread regarding Boeing Co. layoffs

Boeing knew doomed 737-MAX plane was ‘pig with lipstick’ but still let it fly

The Boeing flight control engineer had repeatedly raised concerns about the safety of the software on the company’s new 737-MAX airplane they were working on, urging his bosses to implement a back-up system, just like they had done on their Dreamliner model.

But his appeals fell on deaf ears, his managers citing concerns about the cost implications. Angry and frustrated, Ewbank quit Boeing in 2015 after his manager told him: “People have to die before Boeing will change things.”

Three years later, on October 29, 2018, fishermen working off the coast of Jakarta, Indonesia, watched in horror as a Lion Air Boeing 737-MAX plowed into the water at 500 miles per hour, ki----g all 189 people on board.
few months later, on March 10, 2019, another 737-MAX crashed after take-off from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, leaving 157 people dead.

Investigations later found that both aircrafts had suffered the same fatal issue with the plane’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) software — one of the critical concerns Ewbank had flagged to Boeing. The system had accidentally triggered on the two planes because a faulty angle of attack (AOA) sensor had transmitted inaccurate information about the position of the plane’s nose, causing it to nosedive, something the pilots were unable to override.

But the two 737-MAX crashes brought the company to its knees — exposing decades of skimping and saving, cost-cutting and compromises that led to both tragedies.

Boeing’s merger with rival McDonnell Douglas in 1996 was key, because it led to a wholesale change in the airline giant’s ethos, much to the displeasure of staff, Robison argues. Boeing executives, for example, now found themselves having to adopt the “5-15 rule,” imported from McDonnell, where memos shouldn’t take more than five minutes to read and 15 minutes to write. “The idealism just went out,” one insider told Robison. “It was about something else – I guess shareholder value.”

But the two 737-MAX crashes brought the company to its knees — exposing decades of skimping and saving, cost-cutting and compromises that led to both tragedies.

Boeing’s merger with rival McDonnell Douglas in 1996 was key, because it led to a wholesale change in the airline giant’s ethos, much to the displeasure of staff, Robison argues. Boeing executives, for example, now found themselves having to adopt the “5-15 rule,” imported from McDonnell, where memos shouldn’t take more than five minutes to read and 15 minutes to write. “The idealism just went out,” one insider told Robison. “It was about something else – I guess shareholder value.”

https://www.google.com/amp/s/nypost.com/2021/11/24/boeing-knowingly-flew-pig-with-lipstick-737-max-plane/amp/

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Post ID: @OP+1e26HtEQ

6 replies (most recent on top)

If they "meaning the Boeing Board of Miscreants"
Were held fully accountable, They would be on Dҽath Row
Where The Belong
☠☠☠☠☠☠☠☠☠

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Post ID: @3mkv+1e26HtEQ

Reuters) -Three U.S. House Democrats on Monday asked the head of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to provide more details of the agency's oversight of Boeing's 737 MAX and questioned whether the planemaker had been held fully accountable.

The best-selling, single-aisle airplane, which was grounded for 20 months after two crashes ki---d 346 people in the space of five months, returned to service in late 2020.

The lawmakers, including House Transportation and Infrastructure chairman Peter DeFazio, asked FAA Administrator Steve Di-kson in a letter Monday what the agency had done, if anything to hold Boeing employees responsible for various transgressions. It asks for a response by Dec. 13.

The letter said these included Boeing's apparent violation of its approved 737 MAX type design, as well as evidence of an internal plan to downplay the significance of a key safety system called MCAS tied to both fatal crashes.

An FAA spokeswoman said the agency would respond directly to the committee. Boeing did not immediately comment.

The letter said the lawmakers were "deeply troubled by the absence of rigorous accountability for Boeing's past transgressions related to the 737 MAX and the FAA's failure to hold those who violated the public's trust accountable".

Earlier this month, the FAA's Di-kson told a U.S. congressional panel that Boeing had more to do as the U.S. planemaker continues to face scrutiny.

"Boeing is not the same as it was two years ago but they have more to work to do," Di-kson said. "We have reset the relationship with Boeing in no uncertain terms."

In a Nov. 2 letter, acting manager for aviation safety in the local FAA office that oversees Boeing, Ian Won, told the planemaker that company appointees performing work for the agency did not have the required expertise and some employees were not meeting FAA expectations.

Di-kson said the FAA was delegating fewer responsibilities to Boeing for aircraft certification and was "demanding more transparency" from manufacturers.

The FAA is currently scrutinizing a number of issues involving Boeing airplanes.

Boeing agreed to a deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department in January including $2.5 billion in fines and compensation stemming from the 737 MAX crashes.

Last month, a former Boeing chief technical pilot was charged with fraud for deceiving federal regulators evaluating the company's 737 MAX jet.

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Post ID: @2cya+1e26HtEQ

It has been a long road to get where we are. Leadership started digging with garden trowels 25 years ago and have since upgraded to full size shovels.

My mom always said that when you are in a ho-e, the first thing you do is stop digging. But in true Jack Welsh fashion, Boeing is upgrading to backhoes

We will not start building a ladder out of this ho-e until another Aeroman (or woman) is CEO, but it will take a change of heart by a feckless board to make that happen.

https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-boeing-was-set-on-the-path-to-disaster-by-the-cult-of-jack-welch?fbclid=IwAR3ewUeb1NfvxtrRCiMaRwovZdKxv-inTqf9I49A6qduhyFdTLCNgdg09qI

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Post ID: @1mvz+1e26HtEQ

Remember back in 2018 (Renton) when management was bragging about
And laughed about how we just copied the Airbus A320 Sharklets
Yep we didn’t have to spend a dime in development
They did all the heaving lifting and we reaped the rewards

Remember all the pain and trouble Airbus went through to develop its
FBW technology, Software, Flight Control Computers, Sensors - Pitot & AoA
Remember all the accidents, Remember the horrific loss of life.
Eventually they got it right.

So Our Idea Was To – install a quasi FBW system on the cheap, in order to
Jerry-Rig the MAX so as to avoid a new type certificate and all that entails.
All of this was done with “Full Knowledge” IE detailed reports from Airbus
and the FAA regarding the failures and lessons learned in implementing a
FBW system safely, using three redundant FCC and a multitude of sensors
as seen in the link below
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/960x720/a350probes_zps123a792c_ccc5cfb5252a85fca5dc47ccf1af864c9dfb02f6.jpg

We Are Boeing, “We Can Do It Better” – Translation – “We Can Do It Cheaper”
A person would have to have been Brain Deạd for them not to know
that people were going to dĩe in this Rub Goldberg Dҽathtrap

Boeing We Bring Lying To A Whole New Level.
So Trust US, when we say "No New Layoffs".

@OP+1e1hyPiS --- And The MAX Lie Continues
✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈

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Post ID: @ttp+1e26HtEQ

McDonnell executives, later described by federal mediators as “hunter ki---r as-----ns,” clashed with Boeing’s “Boy Scouts,” and the workforce grew increasingly disgruntled. In 1999, when engineers were told they would no longer get bonuses in their contracts, it prompted the largest white-collar strike in US history with over 23,000 Boeing workers in six states walking out. Boeing eventually caved but the 40-day strike cost the company an estimated $750 million,
Staff discontent continued to deepen. In 2009, when Boeing launched their new plane, the Dreamliner, workers nicknamed it the “Bottom Liner” and the “End-of-the-Liner,” such was the mood of the weary workforce.
Meanwhile, Phil Condit, Boeing’s CEO at the time, was busy flying around the world on the new $50 million “Boeing Business Jet” he had commissioned with his (fourth) wife, Geda. A conversion of the 737, it was, at the time, the world’s largest-ever business jet, complete with a queen-sized bed, an office, a sofa-lined lounge with a 42-inch flat screen TV, and two bathrooms, one featuring a $250,000 water-saving AquaJet Shower.

In 2003 Condit resigned. Two weeks later, a BusinessWeek exposé revealed that the board had pressured him to go over his strategic missteps and also his womanizing. The married Condit had pursued a relationship with customer relations manager, Laverne Hawthorne, who was later fired and paid a settlement. Before she was terminated, “she went to see [Condit] in his office and reminded him of promises he had made to her,” BusinessWeek reported. “She looked him in the eye and said: ‘One of us in this room has ba--s, and it certainly isn’t you.’”

By the time a fourth redesign of the 737 was given the go-ahead in 2011, largely in a bid to counter the growing threat of Airbus’s A320neo model, the plane was christened the 737-MAX but still failed to impress. “It’s a pig with lipstick,” one former Boeing pilot told Robison. “Such a kludge of an airplane,” remarked the company’s ex-engineer Rick Ludtke. “Designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys,” said one employee who had grown tired of the endless mistakes.

As Robison writes, “Just like the original 737, the design was quick and dirty.”

But unlike the original and its subsequent iterations, the new 737-MAX offered optional extras in a bid to appeal to the growing number of cost-conscious budget airlines. While that made some sense when it came to fittings and furnishings, it was a terrible idea where safety was concerned. “In one fateful example, Boeing charged $80,000 for an AOA indicator — the seemingly peripheral cockpit gauge whose absence would figure in the doomed Lion Air and Ethiopian flights, neither of which was equipped with the optional equipment,” Robison writes.

Getty Images
Worse, Boeing refused to make any changes to the new plane that required existing 737 pilots to retrain using simulators.

Business was tough. While American Airlines placed a $38 billion order for 200 of the MAX, they also ordered 260 of Airbus’s A320neo. As of December 2019, a little over 15,000 of the MAX had been ordered but only 10,571 delivered.

After 10 years at the helm, McNerney retired in 2015, handing over the reins to 51-year-old Dennis Muilenburg who had worked at Boeing since 1985 and was president and CEO of its defense space and security business.

Meanwhile, as the 737 MAX flew, Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) officials sought to inspect the plane but were waved away by Boeing engineers giving them “the drawer full of paper” technique. “If you can just inundate them with information it makes them go away,” one engineer told Robison.

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Post ID: @nvl+1e26HtEQ

Quite the read, thank you for sharing. what I got out of it was,
The safety of our bonuses is a core value for all members of the Boeing Board

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Post ID: @fzx+1e26HtEQ

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